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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 47578-2019

)
)

V.

)

Jerome County Case N0.
CR27-18—4507

)

NICKOLAS ZACHORIAH FAIRCHILD,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

ISSUES
1.

Has Nickolas Zachoriah
sentencing discretion

Fairchild failed t0

When

it

show

that the district court

abused

its

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve years, With three
upon his conviction for possession of

years ﬁxed, and retained jurisdiction

methamphetamine?
2.

Has

Fairchild failed to

show

that the district court

denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion?

abused

its

discretion

when

it

ARGUMENT
I.

Fairchild

A.

Has Failed To Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

A police

ofﬁcer arrested Fairchild 0n an outstanding warrant.

his arrest, ofﬁcers conducted a search of Fairchild’s vehicle

Subsequent to

(R., p.12.)

and discovered a glass smoking pipe

With a White crystal substance inside and several syringes that contained a liquid. (R., pp.13-15.)

The

liquid

and the

crystal

substance tested presumptively positive for amphetamines and

methamphetamine, respectively.
methamphetamine.

The

(R., pp.14-15.)

state

(R., pp.36-37.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Fairchild pled guilty.

recommend a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve
pp.54, 57.)

The case was

pp.63-69), but he

charge Fairchild with possession of

years, with three years determinate,

set for sentencing.

was not accepted

into the

(R., p.55.) Fairchild

program

The

(R., pp.54-58.)

state

and drug

(R., pp.81-83.)

Fairchild

(R., pp.72, 81; PSI, p.9).

was ultimately denied drug court

court in that case imposed a uniﬁed sentence of

jurisdiction.

ﬁve

court.

(R.,

then applied for drug court (R.,

The

ﬁrst scheduled

sentencing hearing was continued to allow Fairchild to be sentenced in a pending

case.

agreed t0

in

years, With

Ada County

Ada County

as well,

and the

two years ﬁxed, and retained

(12/10/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.12-15; p.5, Ls.16-19.)

Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement in this case, the state

uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve years, With three years determinate, and
retained jurisdiction. (12/10/1 8 Tr., p.4, L.22

— p.5,

recommended a

either drug court or a period

L.8.) Fairchild joined in the

of

recommendation,

but also requested that the court run his sentence in this case concurrent With the sentence imposed
in his

Ada County

case.

(12/10/18 Tr., p.5, Ls.10-22.) The court imposed a uniﬁed sentence of

ﬁve

years, with three years determinate, concurrent the

jurisdiction.

recommended that the court relinquish jurisdiction.

state

Fairchild’s trial counsel admitted that Fairchild

Tr., p.9, Ls.1-8.)

Violations,” but nevertheless

moved

for a reduction

L23. 1) “[I]ndependent 0f the

court in this case found

fact that [the

good cause

jurisdiction,

imposed the

original sentence 0f

0/22/ 1 9

committed “too many

Ada County

Ada County court]

t0 relinquish jurisdiction

throughout the rider programming. (10/22/19

(1

[rules]

of the ﬁxed portion of his sentence from three

years t0 two years in order t0 mirror his sentence in the

1,

sentence and retained

(12/10/18 T11, p.6, Ls.17-22; R., pp.92-95.)

Following the rider, the

p.1

Ada County

Tr., p. 12,

(10/22/19 Tr., L. 10

case.

—

relinquished jurisdiction,” the

based 0n Fairchild’s conduct

L.13 — p.13, L. 14.) The court relinquished

ﬁve years with

three years determinate, and denied

the request for a reduction of that sentence. (10/22/19 Tr., p.13, L.15

— p.14,

L.1

1.)

Fairchild timely appealed. (R., pp.1 18-2 1 .)

Standard

B.

Of Review

The length 0f a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State
that the

V.

claim

(ﬂ

that probation

22; p.1

“recommended probation” during the
— p.1 1, L.23).) This

(Appellant’s brief, p.3 (citing 10/22/19 Tr., p.9, L.10

belied by the record. Fairchild never explicitly requested probation during the rider review

is

hearing.

and the

will be the defendant's

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

In his opening brief, Fairchild states that his trial counsel

rider review hearing.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

probable term of conﬁnement. Li. (citing State

1

V.

10/22/19 Tr., p.9, L.10 — p.1

L.23.)

Indeed, his

trial

counsel actually conceded

was “probably not in the cards here today because” 0f Fairchild’s rules Violations
Ada County district court relinquished jurisdiction. (10/22/ 19 Tr., p.9, Ls. 10-

fact that the
1,

1,

Ls.1-23.)

Where
is

a sentence

is

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

a clear abuse 0f discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing

State V. Lundguist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d

is

27 (2000)).

When a trial court’s discretionary decision

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the

lower court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion;
discretion; (3) acted consistently With

it;

it

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by an

(2) acted Within the

any legal standards applicable

boundaries 0f such

to the speciﬁc choices before

exercise of reason. State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,

429

P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citation omitted).

C.

Fairchild

T0
that,

Has Shown No Abuse Of The

District Court’s Sentencing Discretion

carry the burden 0f demonstrating an abuse 0f discretion, the appellant must establish

under any reasonable View of the

facts, the

sentence

was

excessive.

State V. Farwell, 144

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining Whether the appellant met

this

the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant

is

burden,

0n parole

exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be

the period ofactual incarceration. State V. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)

(citing

Lver, 144 Idaho

the appellant

at

726, 170 P.3d at 391).

must demonstrate

that reasonable

T0

establish that the sentence

was

excessive,

minds could not conclude the sentence was

appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,

and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho

at

736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘A sentence

is

reasonable if it appears

necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective 0f protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

all

the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96,

P.3d

at

1236-37 (quoting State

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).

0f

392

Here, the imposed sentence ﬁts within the statutory limits.

possession of methamphetamine

is

seven years.

year sentence does not exceed the statutory
light

of the governing

Idaho

at

criteria, is

He

460, 50 P.3d at 475.

Fairchild’s sentence

is

The maximum penalty

I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).

uniﬁed ﬁve-

Fairchild’s

maximum. Thus, he “must show

that the sentence, in

excessive under any reasonable View of the facts.”

cannot do

reasonable.

m1, 137

so.

In imposing Fairchild’s sentence, the district court

expressly considered the four goals of sentencing.

(12/10/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-5.)

The court

emphasized the need for rehabilitation given the nature of the underlying charge. (12/10/18
p.6, Ls.2-5.)

The court

for

also expressly considered the factors

enumerated in LC.

§

Tr.,

19-2521 to

determine whether probation or a term of imprisonment was an appropriate sentence in this case.
(12/10/18 T11, p.6, Ls.7-10.)

“[B]ased upon the information in the PSI and the overall

recommendation,” the court determined that “retained jurisdiction

is

appropriate.” (12/10/18 TL,

p.6, Ls.13-16.)

Fairchild erroneously argues his sentence

weight to mitigating factors

it

is

excessive because had the court given proper

would have imposed a

lesser sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.)

Speciﬁcally, Fairchild argues that the court failed t0 give proper consideration to his substance

abuse problem and his childhood abuse. (Appellant’s

The record belies

brief, pp.6-7.)

His argument lacks merit.

the contention that the district court did not properly consider Fairchild’s

substance abuse problem.

The court expressly based

its

sentence “upon the information in the

PSI,” which included information regarding Fairchild’s history of substance abuse. (12/ 10/ 1 8 T11,
p.6, Ls.13-16; see PSI, pp.13-15, 21-31.)

smokes marijuana once or twice

daily,

The PSI noted

that Fairchild occasionally uses alcohol,

smokes synthetic cannabinoids, occasionally

methamphetamine, and once used cocaine. (PSI,

p.

1

3.)

The PSI was

also clear that he

injects

began using

drugs at a young age.

methamphetamine

ﬁrst used marijuana at

.

at

,

drank alcohol

and injected

at

(Li) According t0 Fairchild, despite consuming

he had never attended substance abuse treatment. (PSI,

the

six

He

illicit

p. 14.) Fairchild

drugs from

had

at least

misdemeanor convictions, one 0f which was possession of a controlled substance, and a felony

conviction for possession 0f a controlled substance. (PSI, pp.7-8.)

also

had pending charges

of a controlled substance and possession 0f drug paraphernalia.

for possession

Moreover, in

He

light

0f

this

(PSI, p.8.)

substance abuse information and the nature of the charge, the court

emphasized the need for rehabilitation

in Fairchild’s sentence.

(12/10/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-5; PSI,

pp.15, 21-31.)
Fairchild also argues that the court failed t0 properly consider his “childhood history” 0f

“broken homes and abuse.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

Fairchild’s trial counsel did not present

Tr., p.5,

Ls.10-22.)

When

However, during the sentencing hearing

any argument related

to Fairchild’s upbringing. (12/ 1 0/ 1 8

given the opportunity to speak in mitigation of punishment, Fairchild

declined. (12/10/1 8 Tr., p.5, L.24

— p.6,

L. 1 .) Notwithstanding the fact that neither Fairchild nor

his counsel presented information about his abusive childhood, such information

the PSI,

which the court expressly considered

was contained

in fashioning Fairchild’s sentence.

in

(12/10/18 Tr.,

p.6, Ls.13-16; PSI, pp.9-10, 20.)

The sentence imposed was reasonable because

the court expressly considered the four

goals of sentencing, emphasized the need for rehabilitation, considered the factors in § 19-2521,

and determined

The mitigating

that retained jurisdiction

factors Fairchild relies

the imposition 0f a lesser sentence.

discretion,

and Fairchild has

failed t0

was appropriate based upon

the information in the PSI.

on were properly considered by the court and did not require
Therefore, the district court did not abuse

show

otherwise.

its

sentencing

II.

Fairchild

A.

Has Failed Show That The

Court Abused
Rule 35 Motion

District

Its

Discretion

When It Denied His

Introduction

During the rider review hearing, Fairchild orally moved for a reduction of his sentence
pursuant t0 Idaho Criminal Rule 35.

(10/21/19 Tr., p.9, L.20

—

p.10, L.5; p.14, Ls.1-3.)

Speciﬁcally, Fairchild requested a reduction of ﬁxed term of his sentence from three years to two.

(10/21/19 Tr., p.9, L.24

—

p.10, L.5.)

The

denied his motion. {10/21/19

district court

Tr., p.14,

Ls.1-4.)

Standard

B.

Of Review

“If a sentence

35

is

is

within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction 0f sentence under Rule

a plea for leniency, and

Huffman, 144 Idaho
P.3d 381, 385

(Ct.

at

we review

the denial 0f the motion for an abuse 0f discretion.”

203, 159 P.3d at 840; see also State V. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415

App. 2015) (“A motion

for reduction

of sentence under I.C.R. 35

a plea for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court”).

In conducting a review 0f

the denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court considers the entire record and applies the

same

used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. Anderson, 163 Idaho
P.3d

C.

at

essentially

is

at

criteria

517, 415

385.

The District Court Did Not Abuse
Motion
Fairchild has failed t0

show

Its

Discretion

that the district court

When

abused

Rule 35 motion. T0 prevail on appeal, Fairchild “must show

V.

its

Denied Fairchild’s Rule 35

discretion

when

it

denied his

that the sentence is excessive in light

of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
35 motion.” State

It

district court in

support of the Rule

Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013) (internal quotations

Fairchild argues that he presented

omitted).

written

by

information in the form of a

of support

letter

mother and the progress he made towards rehabilitation during

his

programming. (Appellant’s
Fairchild

The court read

new

his

rider

brief, pp.9-10.)

shows n0 abuse 0f discretion.

the letter authored

by

First, the

Fairchild’s

court considered his mother’s support.

mother during the

aware ofher presence in support ofher son. (10/21/19

rider review hearing

and was

Tr., p.8, Ls.2-19.)

Second, the court correctly found that “the content of the

APSI

doesn’t quite square with

the recommendations of the Department 0f Corrections for probation.” (1 0/21/ 19 T11, p. 1 3, Ls. 12-

14.)

Although Fairchild made some progress towards rehabilitation while participating in the rider
With an LSI-R score 0f 35.

(PSI, p.54.)

Additionally, he received eleven disciplinary actions while 0n the rider. (PSI, p.55.)

Based 0n his

programming, he remained a high risk

t0 reoffend

repeated rules Violations the court found that his behavior had not improved over time because the
Violations

were “spaced throughout the

rider program.”

(10/21/19 Tr., p.12, L.20

—

p.13, L.4.)

Furthermore, the court accepted the Department’s conclusion that Fairchild’s unwillingness t0
the rules indicated that he

may have

similar issues following the terms of probation as

abide

by

well.

(PSI, pp.55, 58; 10/21/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.5-12.)

The Department noted

that

he “only exerted

a minimal effort t0 be successﬁll at NICI,” and also “procrastinated” the completion of his

mandated pre-release programming despite having “zero scheduling conﬂicts throughout
‘Rider.”’

(PSI, p.58.)

Ultimately, the district court concluded that Fairchild

his

was “not a good

candidate for probation, that probation would not meet rehabilitative goals, and that [Fairchild]

is

not likely t0 be able t0 comply with the conditions 0f probation at this point in time.” (10/21/19
Tr., p.13,

Ls.15-21.)

Accordingly, the court relinquished jurisdiction, imposed the original

W

sentence, and denied the oral Rule 35 motion.

did not abuse

The

its

discretion in doing so,

(10/21/19 Tr., p.13, L.15

and Fairchild has

state respectfully requests this

failed t0

show

—

p.14, L.4.)

The

court

otherwise.

Court to afﬁrm the judgment ofconviction and the order

denying Fairchild’s Rule 35 motion.

DATED this 5th day 0f August, 2020.

Justin R. Porter

/s/

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that

copy of the foregoing
File and Serve:

I

have

this 5th

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

day of August, 2020, served a true and correct
below by means of iCourt

to the attorney listed
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CHIEF,

documents@sapd.state.id.us
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Justin R. Porter
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